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PROJECT LIFE, INC. V. GLENDE."NING: 1 SEEKING SANCTUARY FOR 
WOMEN RECOVERING FROM SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROBLEMS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Discrimination against people with disabilities is widespread 
throughout America.2 From the simple failure of businesses and 
schools to provide easy access for users of wheelchairs, to the more 
deeply ingrained and insidious personal prejudices held by Americans 
from all walks of life,3 Americans with disabilities have long faced dis-
crimination in varied forms. 
Congress has attempted to address the problem of discrimination 
against the disabled with such initiatives as the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act (ADA)4 and the Fair Housing Act (FHA).5 The ADA provides 
redress for discrimination against the disabled in the areas of employ-
ment, services and facilities, and public accommodations.6 Similarly, 
the FHA protects the disabled from discrimination in the purchase 
1. 139 F. Supp. 2d 703 (D. Md. 2001). 
2. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the U!1iv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 391-424 
(2001) (Breyer,]., dissenting) (cataloging submissions to the Task Force on 
Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities describing specific 
instances of discrimination against people with disabilities). 
3. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Carney, 598 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1979). Despite a record 
replete with expert testimony that a quadriplegic custodial father was a fit 
parent and fully capable of providing a healthy family environment for his 
children, the trial judge ordered a change of custody to the mother based 
solely on his prediction that the father's disability would render him unable 
to have a "normal relationship" with his children. Id. at 40-41. The Su-
preme Court of California reversed, holding that the trial judge erred in 
ordering a change of custody when the evidence failed to establish that the 
father's disability would have an adverse effect on the best interests of the 
children. Id. at 44-45. 
The U.S. House of Representatives recognized that much of the dis-
crimination faced by the disabled in America results not from any evil in-
tent, but rather from simple carelessness: 
Discrimination against people with disabilities results from actions 
or inactions that discriminate by effect as well as by intent or de-
sign. Discrimination also includes harms resulting from the con-
struction of transportation, architectural, and communication 
barriers or the adoption or application of standards, criteria, prac-
tices or procedures that are based on thoughtlessness or indiffer-
ence-that discrimination resulting from benign neglect. 
H.R. REp. No. 101-485 (II), at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
310-11. 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2001). 
5. Id. §§ 3601-3631. 
6. Id. §§ 12112, 12118. 
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and rental of dwellings and in the provision of services and facilities in 
connection with dwellings. 7 
Discrimination against disabled Americans, however, often takes 
subtler forms than the failure of businesses to employ the disabled or 
to provide necessary services or facilities to the disabled.8 In Project 
Life, Inc. v. Glendening, a jury and the United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland took important steps toward leveling the play-
ing field for people with disabilities by extending the protections of 
the ADA and the FHA to the potential clientele of a non-profit organi-
zation-women recovering from substance abuse problems.9 The 
court held that the Maryland Port Authority's delay in leasing a berth 
at the Baltimore Harbor to Project Life, to serve as a docking place for 
the U.S.S. Sanctuary-a decommissioned naval hospital ship that Pro-
ject Life had planned to use as a residential rehabilitation center for 
women recovering from substance abuse-violated both the ADAIO 
and the FHA. I 1 In so holding, the court also refused to allow the State 
of Maryland to avoid liability for these ADA and FHA violations by 
invoking its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.I2 
The Project Life decision has immense positive implications for the 
plight of people recovering from substance abuse in Maryland and, 
potentially, throughout the country. In 1999, an estimated 59,000 
substance abusers lived in Baltimore City alone. I3 The Project Life deci-
sion sends two clear messages: First, the refusal to provide access to 
7. Id. § 3604. 
8. See supra note 3. 
9. 139 F. Supp. 2d 703, 705, 711 (D. Md. 2001). For several years, courts have 
upheld claims of discrimination brought by recovering substance abusers, 
or organizations that serve recovering substance abusers, under the ADA 
and the FHA. See, e.g., MX Group, Inc. v. Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 328 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (affirming the lower court's finding that a city zoning ordinance 
excluding methadone clinics constituted discrimination against recovering 
substance abusers in violation of the ADA); United States v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 
955 F.2d 914, 916 (4th Cir. 1992) (affirming an injunction issued against an 
apartment management group that refused to lease apartments to a com-
munity drug- and alcohol-abuse rehabilitation program because of animus 
toward the program's clients in violation of the FHA); Hispanic Counseling 
Ctr., Inc. v. Hempstead, 237 F. Supp. 2d 284, 287, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(granting a preliminary injunction on a claim that a zoning amendment 
preventing a non-profit substance abuse treatment center from relocating 
to a new building constituted discrimination against the treatment center's 
clients in violation of the ADA); Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 68 
F. Supp. 2d 602,606 (D. Md. 1999) (denying a defendant-county's motion 
for summary judgment on a plaintiff-methadone clinic's ADA claim that 
the county discriminated against the plaintiff's opiate-addicted clients by 
denying permits for the construction of a methadone treatment facility). 
10. Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 706-07. 
11. See id. at 711. 
12. See id. at 707 n.5. 
13. Baltimore City Health Dept., Baltimore City 1999 Health Status Report, 
available at http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/government/health/1999status 
report/abuse.html. 
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services and facilities to groups seeking to help this segment of the 
population, simply because of negative public sentiment against such 
people, violates the ADA and the FHA; and second, such discrimina-
tion can find redress under those statutes. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the history and applicable provi-
sions of the ADA and the FHA; the states' immunity under the Elev-
enth Amendment; Congress's abrogation of that immunity under the 
ADA; the ongoing dispute over the validity of that abrogation in the 
wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Trustees of the Univer-
sity of Alabama v. Garrett, 14 and the injunctive relief that remains availa-
ble in the absence of monetary damages. Part III analyzes the 
decision in Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening and concludes that the court 
correctly found violations of both the ADA and the FHA in the actions 
of the Maryland Port Authority and extended the relief provided by 
those statutes to Project Life. Additionally, Part III asserts that the 
Fourth Circuit has taken a misguided position on the validity of Con-
gress's abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity and 
that the Supreme Court should step in and clarify the applicability of 
its holding in Garrett. Finally, Part IV concludes that, whatever the 
Supreme Court's ultimate decision on the applicability of Garrett to 
Title II of the ADA, the Project Life decision exemplifies the injunctive 
relief available to plaintiffs for state-sanctioned violations of the ADA 




Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 as a response to the established 
and growing problem of discrimination against individuals with disa-
bilities. 15 Mter hearing testimony from countless organizations and 
individuals concerning the problem of discrimination against the dis-
abled in America, Congress found "a compelling need to establish a 
clear and comprehensive Federal prohibition of discrimination on the 
basis of disability in the areas of employment in the private sector, 
public accommodations, public services, transportation, and telecom-
munications."16 Section 12101 of the ADA sets out nine congressional 
findings that precipitated the passage of the Act.17 Specifically, Con-
gress found that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physi-
calor mental disabilities,"18 and that these disabled Americans are 
14. 531 V.S. 356 (2001). 
15. See 42 V.S.C. § 12101 (a) (2001). 
16. H.R. REp. No. 101-485(11), at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 V.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
310. 
17. 42 V.S.C. § 12101(a). 
18. [d. § 12101(a)(I). 
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historically isolated from society and face discrimination in myriad ar-
eas. 19 In addition, Congress found that, "unlike individuals who have 
experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national 
origin, religion or age," disabled individuals often lack "legal recourse 
to redress such discrimination."2o Congress further found that dis-
crimination against disabled Americans takes many different forms,21 
and that such discrimination "costs the United States billions of dol-
lars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and 
non productivity. "22 
Based on its findings concerning discrimination against disabled 
Americans, Congress enacted the ADA with several concrete purposes 
in mind, each serving the overarching goal of eliminating discrimina-
tion against disabled individuals.23 According to the ADA, the pur-
poses of the act include: Providing a "national mandate" for 
eradicating the problem of discrimination against the disa,bled;24 es-
tablishing specific standards for addressing discrimination against 
people with disabilities;25 and securing the participation of the federal 
government in the enforcement of ADA standards.26 Significantly, 
Congress's fourth and final avowed purpose behind the ADA is "to 
invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to 
enforce the fourteenth amendment" to help remedy the problem of 
discrimination against people with disabilities.27 
2. Individuals with Substance Abuse Problems are Disabled Within 
the Meaning of the ADA 
Congress's intent that the ADA have a far-reaching scope manifests 
itself in the very broad definition of the term "disability" provided by 











Id. § 12101 (a)(2)-(3). Significant areas in which Congress found wide-
spread discrimination to exist include "employment, housing, public ac-
commodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, 
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services." 
Id. § 12101 (a) (3). 
Id. § 12101(a)(4). 
See id. § 12101(a)(5). According to Congress, discrimination against dis-
abled individuals can take widely different forms, from "outright inten-
tional exclusion" to "relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, 
benefits, jobs, or other opportunities." Id. 
Id. § 12101(a)(9). 
See generally id. § 12101(b). 
Id. S 12101(b)(1). 
See id. § 12101(b)(2). 
See id. § 12101(b)(3). 
Id. § 12101(b)(4). Indeed, Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment plays a central role in its subsequent abrogation of the state's 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of 
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). That Congress intended the ADA to have 
a wide scope is also evidenced by language describing the purpose of the 
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ADA, the Act defines "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
individual. "29 
The ADA itself does not provide an exhaustive list, or any list at all, 
of specific kinds of physical or mental impairments that qualify as "dis-
abilities" for purposes of the Act.30 Individuals recovering from sub-
stance abuse problems, however, do fit within the broad definition of 
individuals with disabilities provided by the ADA.31 
The text of the ADA provides some guidance on whether or not 
drug addiction constitutes a disability within the meaning of the 
ADA. 32 A person who currently uses drugs is not considered an individ-
ual with a disability under the ADA and, thus, is not protected from 
discrimination.33 Recovering substance abusers, however, are consid-
ered individuals with disabilities under the ADA.34 Courts have also 
act as providing "a clear and comprehensive national mandate" for elimi-
nating discrimination against disabled individuals. [d. § 12101(b)(I). 
29. [d. § 12102(2)(A). The group of individuals protected by the ADA is fur-
ther expanded by the additional definitions of the term "disability" as a 
record of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such an individual or "being regarded as 
having such an impairment." [d. § 12102(2)(B)-(C). 
30. See infra note 34. 
3l. In its memorandum opinion on the Project Life defendants' initial motion to 
dismiss, the court stated: "there is no dispute that ... an individual recover-
ing from substance abuse is an individual with a disability under the ADA." 
Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening, No. WMN-98-2163, 1998 WL 1119864, at 
*2 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 1998). 
32. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12210. 
33. See id. § 1221O(a) ("For purposes of this chapter, the term 'individual with a 
disability' does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the 
illegal use of drugs, when a covered entity acts on the basis of such use."). 
The Code of Federal Regulations defines "current use of illegal drugs" as 
use that "occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a per-
son's drul? use is current or that continuing drug use is a real and ongoing 
problem.' 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2003). Thus, some courts have held that 
certain plaintiffs were not entitled to protection under the ADA because 
their drug use presented a "real and ongoing problem," even though they 
had taken steps to address their drug problems. See 1 Americans with Disa-
bilities: Practice and Compliance Manual § 2:5 (2003) (citing Wormley v. 
Arkla, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1079 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (denying a plaintiff's claim 
that his termination constituted disability discrimination in violation of the 
ADA where the evidence showed that he had violated the terms of a rein-
statement agreement by relapsing in his drug use, despite the fact that he 
was drug-free and had just completed a rehabilitation program at the time 
of his termination); Colo. State Bd. of Med. Exam' rs v. Davis, 893 P .2d 1365 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (denying a drug-addicted doctor's claim that the rev-
ocation of his medical license violated the ADA because of evidence of fre-
quent relapses, despite his past and present participation in rehabilitation 
programs)) . 
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 1221O(b). The ADA provides that while a current drug user 
is not considered an "individual with a disability for the purposes of the 
ADA, a person who "has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabili-
tation program," has "otherwise been rehabilitated successfully," or "is par-
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consistently recognized that individuals recovering from substance 
abuse are disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 35 
3. Title II of the ADA: Protections of the Disabled Against Discrimi-
nation in the Provision of Services by a Public Entity 
In addition to the protections provided by the ADA in the areas of 
employment and public accommodations, Title II of the ADA prohib-
its discrimination against the disabled in the provision of services by a 
public entity.36 Title II provides that "no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from partici-
pation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activi-
ties of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity."37 
To guide the application of the pertinent anti-discrimination provi-
sions of Title II, the ADA defines more than the term "disability."38 
According to the Act, the term "public entity," as used in Title II, re-
ticipating in a supervised rehabilitation program," and who no longer 
engages in illegal drug use, is not excluded from the definition of "individ-
ual with a disability" for purposes of the ADA. See id. § 1221O(b). 
While the text of the ADA itself does not provide a list of specific con-
ditions or handicaps that qualify as disabilities within the meaning of the 
Act, the Code of Federal Regulations does provide such a list. See generally 
28 C.F.R. § 35.104. According to the Code of Federal Regulations, drug 
addiction and alcoholism can both constitute a "physical or mental impair-
ment" within the meaning of the ADA. Id. The list of qualifying "physical 
or mental impairments" in the Code of Federal Regulations, which in-
cludes, among many other conditions, physiological disorders, cosmetic dis-
figurement, mental retardation, learning disabilities, HN, cancer, and 
speech, hearing, and vision impairments, further evidences the broad 
reach of the ADA. Id. Despite the provisions in the ADA itself and in the 
Code of Federal Regulations for recovering substance abusers as individuals 
with disabilities, recovering substance abusers still need to show that their 
addictions "substantially limit one or more of their major life activities" in 
order to sustain a challenge under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (B)-
(C). See also supra note 33. 
35. See MX Group, Inc. v. Covington, 293 F.3d 326,336 (6th Cir. 2002) (observ-
ing that potential clients of methadone clinic were disabled within the 
meaning of the ADA); Regional Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. Mid-
dletown, 294 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir. 2002) (recognizing that recovering drug 
addicts and alcoholics-prospective participants in halfway house treat-
ment programs-were disabled within the meaning of the ADA); Thomp-
son v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that "drug 
addiction that substantially limits one or more major life activities is a rec-
ognized disability under the ADA"); Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co., 155 
F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a person who has completed 
a drug rehabilitation program and is no longer using drugs may be consid-
ered disabled within the meaning of the ADA). 
36. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
37. Id. 
38. See generally id. § 12131. 
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fers generally to any state or local government, or to any division of a 
state or local government.39 
Title II similarly defines a "qualified individual with a disability" in 
broad terms. 40 For the purposes of Title II, the ADA protects any dis-
abled individual who "meets the essential eligibility requirements" for 
anyone seeking to receive the services of, or participate in programs 
offered by, a public entityY Most importantly, a disabled individual 
who "meets the essential eligibility requirements" of a public entity is 
protected by the ADA whether or not the public entity would be re-
quired to: (1) make "reasonable modifications to [its] rules, policies, 
or practices"; (2) remove "architectural, communication, or transpor-
tation barriers"; or (3) provide "auxiliary aids and services" in order to 
provide its services to the disabled individual or facilitate the participa-
tion of the disabled individual in its programs or activities.42 The ap-
plication of the broad definitions of "qualified individual with a 
disability" and "public entity" to the language of § 12132 of Title II, 
therefore, makes it unlawful for a state or local government, in any of 
its varied capacities, to discriminate against the disabled in the provi-
sion of its services.43 . 
39. [d. § 12131(1}. More specifically, the term "public entity," as used in Title 
II of the ADA, refers to "any department, agency, special purpose district or 
other instrumentality of a State or States or local government," as well as 
"the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter author-
ity." Id. § 12131 (I) (B}-(C). 
40. See generally id. § 12131(2}. 
41. [d. 
42. [d. 
43. See id. See also id. § 12132. For cases demonstrating the broad sweep of 
Title II of the ADA, see generally Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding that parole proceedings were an activity of a public entity 
and that "a broad rule categorically excluding parole decisions from the 
scope of Title II is not the law"); Hispanic Counseling Ctr., Inc. v. Hempstead, 
237 F. Supp. 2d 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting a preliminary injunction 
barring a municipality from preventing a nonprofit substance abuse treat-
ment center from relocating because the treatment center had demon-
strated a likelihood of success on the merits of a claim that the zoning 
ordinance prohibiting treatment centers in districts zoned for business vio-
lated Title II); Calloway v. Glassboro Dep't of Police, 89 F. Supp. 2d 543 (D.N]. 
2000) (holding that investigative questioning of a suspect by police consti-
tuted the services or activities of a public entity and that discrimination 
against deaf suspects during such questioning violated Title II); Soto v. New-
ark, 72 F. Supp. 2d 489 (D.N]. 1999) (holding that a municipal wedding 
ceremony was a service of a public entity under the ADA and that the city's 
failure to provide an interpreter to a profoundly deaf couple at their wed-
ding ceremony denied the couple the benefit of the services of a public 
entity and thus violated Title II); Tyler v. Manhattan, 857 F. Supp. 800 (D. 
Kan. 1994) (holding that a city's failure to postpone meetings of a city com-
mission in order to repair a elevator so that a wheelchair-bound citizen 
could access meeting denied the citizen the benefit of activities of a public 
entity in violation of Title II). 
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4. Remedies Under the ADA 
Section 12133 sets out the enforcement provisions of Title 11.44 Ac-
cording to that section, disabled people who experience discrimina-
tion in the provision of services of a public entity may seek the same 
kinds of remedies available under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.45 
The enforcement provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, in turn, pro-
vide that the remedies available under that legislation are the same as 
those provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for violations of its anti-
discrimination provisions.46 
Section 2000e-16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimi-
nation "based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin" in the 
employment practices of the federal government, and provides for the 
enforcement of that prohibition through "appropriate remedies, in-
cluding reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back 
pay."47 Section 2000e-5 sets out the enforcement provisions for the 
sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that generally prohibit employ-
ment discrimination by any employer, not simply the federal govern-
ment.48 That section authorizes, upon a finding of intentional 
discrimination in employment practices, injunctive relief and 
[S]uch affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may 
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of em-
ployees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, 
employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may 
44. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12133. 
45. See id. See also Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 794a (2003). Section 
12133 of the ADA does not specifically refer to the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, but simply cites the corresponding code section. 42 U.S.c. § 12133. 
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in order to "provide a stat-
utory basis for the Rehabilitation SeIVices Administration" and "authorize 
programs to ... develop and implement comprehensive and continuing 
state plans for providing vocational rehabilitation services to handicapped 
individuals," and to "promote and expand employment opportunities in 
the public and private sectors for handicapped individuals and to place 
such individuals in employment." Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 
93-112, 87 Stat. 355. 
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 
47. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2001). 
48. See id. § 2000e-5. The enforcement provisions of section 2000e-5 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 apply to employment discrimination prohibited by 
sections 2000e-2 and 2000e-3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. Section 
2000e-2 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin by any employer, employment agency, labor organization, 
or training program (and specifically allows employment discrimination 
against members of the Communist Party or others deemed to pose a na-
tional security threat). See id. § 2000e-2. Section 2000e-3 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination against people who have 
publicly opposed an employer's unlawful practices and prohibits employers 
from posting advertisements or notices that indicate a hiring "preference, 
limitation, specification or discrimination" on the basis of any race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. [d. § 2000e-3. 
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be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or 
any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.49 
265 
Neither the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, nor the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 explicitly provides for damages as a remedy for 
violations of anti-discrimination provisions,50 but courts have held that 
violations of Title II are properly redressed by damages of certain 
kinds. According to the relevant case law, compensatory damages are 
available to redress violations of Title II when a plaintiff makes a show-
ing of intentional discrimination.51 Compensatory damages, however, 
are not available under Title II of the ADA to redress "mental anguish 
and humiliation" alleged to have resulted from a defendant's discrimi-
natory conduct.52 Finally, punitive damages are not available to re-
dress claims of discriminatory treatment under Title 11.53 
B. TheFHA 
1. History 
In 1968, Congress enacted the FHA in an attempt to address the 
pervasive problems of discrimination on the basis of race and national 
origin in the sale and rental of housing. 54 In its original form, how-
ever, the FHA did not prohibit discrimination against the disabled in 
the sale or rental of housing. Based upon its finding that handi-
capped individuals, like the originally protected classes, "have been 
denied housing because of misperceptions, ignorance, and outright 
prejudice,"55 Congress amended the FHA in 1988 to prohibit discrimi-
49. [d. § 2000e-5 (g) (1). 
50. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. 
51. See, e.g., Matthews v.Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525, 535-36 (W.D. Ark. 1998) 
(observing that because the enforcement provisions of Title II of the ADA 
encompass those of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, the "full spectrum of remedies" is available under Title II of the 
ADA). 
52. See Tyler v. Manhattan, 857 F. Supp. 800, 819 (D. Kan. 1994). 
53. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) ("Because punitive dam-
ages may not be awarded in private suits brought under ... the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, it follows that they may not be awarded in suits brought under 
... the ADA and ... the Rehabilitation Act."). See also Harrelson v. Elmore 
County, 859 F. Supp. 1465, 1469 (M.D. Ala. 1994). 
54. United States v. Plaza Mobile Estates, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 
2003). Shelley v. Kraemer provides a clear example of the type of discrimina-
tion in housing prevalent at the time of the enactment of the FHA. 334 
U.S. 1 (1948). In that case, the Kraemers, white property owners, sought to 
enforce against the Shelleys, their Mrican-American neighbors, a restrictive 
covenant providing that the Shelleys' land could only be occupied by 
whites. [d. at 6-7. The Supreme Court held that judicial enforcement of 
such a restrictive covenant constituted state action in violation of the Shel-
leys' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. [d. 
at 21. 
55. H.R. REp. No. 100-711, at 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N 2173, 
2179. 
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nation in housing not only on the basis of race and national origin, 
but also on the basis of handicap.56 
2. People Recovering from Substance Abuse Problems are Consid-
ered People with a Handicap Under the FHA 
The FHA protects individuals from discrimination in the sale or 
rental of housing on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, familial 
status, or national origin."57 In addition to these familiar protections, 
however, the FHA also prohibits discrimination in housing on the ba-
sis of "handicap."58 The FHA defines "handicap" in precisely the 
same broad terms as the ADA defines "disability"-"a physical or 
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such per-
son's major life activities, ... a record of having such an impairment, 
or ... being regarded as having such an impairment."59 
Like its definition of "disability" under the ADA, Congress specifi-
cally excluded "current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled sub-
stance" from its definition of "handicap" under the FHA.60 The use of 
the word "current" to describe the kind of controlled substance use 
that the FHA excludes from the definition of "handicap" seems to in-
dicate that people who are recovering from substance abuse are consid-
ered people with a handicap under the FHA, as courts have 







Id. The 1988 amendment added the current subsection (f) to § 3604 of the 
FHA, which includes prohibitions against discrimination in the sale or 
rental of dwellings and in the provision of services and facilities in connec-
tion with dwellings on the basis of handicap, as well as the current require-
ments for handicapped-accessible construction and design of multifamily 
housing. See id. The 1988 amendment also added the current subsection 
(h) to section 3602 of the FHA, which defines "handicap" for the purposes 
of the act and excludes current users of illegal drugs from that definition. 
See id. See also infra note 59. 
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2001). 
See id. 
Ir!. § 3602(h) (1)-(3); Id. § 12lO2(2) (A), (C) (referring to the ADA descrip-
tion of "individual with a disability"). 
Id. § 3602(h) (3). 
See Reg'l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 46 
(2d Cir. 2002) (observing that recovering drug addicts and alcoholics were 
handicapped within the meaning of the FHA); United States v. S. Mgmt. 
Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 917-19 (4th Cir. 1992) (observing that recovering drug 
addicts and alcoholics were handicapped within the meaning of the FHA); 
Conn. Hosp. v. New London, 129 F. Supp. 2d 123, 125 (D. Conn. 2001) 
(recognizing that recovering substance abusers and alcoholics participating 
in halfway house treatment programs were handicapped within the mean-
ing of the FHA); Oxford House, Inc. v. Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("It is well established that individuals recovering from 
drug or alcohol addiction are handicapped under the FHA."); Oxford 
House, Inc. v. Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 459 (D.N]. 1992) ("It is clear 
that Congress contemplated alcoholism and drug addiction as being 
among the kinds of 'impairments' covered under [the] definition [of hand-
icap in the FHA]."). 
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are ostensibly no longer "current" users of controlled substances, al-
though there may be some dispute in the medical field as to whether 
people recovering from substance abuse are "currently" addicted to 
whatever substance they previously abused and remain addicted to 
that substance throughout their lives.62 Read literally, the FHA seems 
to permit discrimination in housing against current users of con-
trolled substances and to prohibit discrimination in housing against 
recovering substance abusers.63 
3. Protections of the Disabled Under the FHA 
The FHA provides several specific protections to people with handi-
caps from discrimination in the sale or rental of housing on the basis 
of handicap (as well as on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, famil-
ial status, and national origin).64 Specifically, the Act makes it unlaw-
ful to publish any advertisement regarding the "sale or rental of a 
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination 
based on ... handicap."65 The Act also prohibits the misrepresenta-
tion about a dwelling's availability to an individual based on the indi-
vidual's handicap.66 Additionally, under the FHA it is unlawful to 
make representations "regarding the entry or prospective entry into 
the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular ... handicap" 
in an effort to convince that person to sell or rent a dwelling.67 Dis-
crimination on the basis of handicap in the sale or rental of a dwelling 
is prohibited, regardless of whether that discrimination takes place on 
the basis of the handicap of the prospective buyer or renter, a person 
who intends to live in the dwelling after its sale or rental, or "any per-








The FHA directs readers to 21 U.S.C. § 802 (2000) for definitions of the 
terminology to exclude current controlled substance users from the defini-
tion of the term "handicap." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). That section defines the 
term "addict" as "any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as 
to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so far 
addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-con-
trol with reference to his addiction." 21 U.S.C. § 802. People recovering 
from substance abuse do not seem to qualify as "addicts" as described 
under this definition; they no longer habitually use narcotic drugs, and 
they are engaged in the active exercise of "self-control with reference to 
[their] addictions." See id. 
The FHA specifically exempts religious organizations and nonprofit organi-
zations "operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with" relig-
ious organizations from all anti-discrimination provisions under the FHA 
except those relating to race, color, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3607(a). The FHA also permits private clubs to restrict the rental of its 
lodgings to its members or to give preference to its members in such rental. 
See id. 
See generally id. § 3604-3606. 
Id. ~ 3604(c). 
See id. § 3604(d). 
Id. § 3604(e). 
Id. § 3604(f)(I)(A)-(C). 
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The Project Life decision utilizes the broadest protection of the dis-
abled against discrimination in housing provided by the FHA, prohib-
iting discrimination "in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or 
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in con-
nection with such dwelling, because of a handicap."69 The FHA delin-
eates certain types of conduct that constitutes discrimination for the 
purposes of § 3604; among those types of conduct is the "refusal to 
make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or ser-
vices" in order to facilitate a handicapped individual's use and enjoy-
ment of a particular dwelling.70 Furthermore, the anti-discrimination 
provisions of the FHA are applicable to dwellings owned or operated 
by the federal government. 71 
4. Remedies Under the FHA 
Section 3613 of the FHA explicitly provides the remedies available 
to private persons seeking redress for housing discrimination prohib-
ited by the FHA.72 The FHA provides that a court may grant "any 
permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or 
other order (including an order enjoining the defendant from engag-
ing in [a discriminatory housing practice] or ordering such affirma-
tive action as may be appropriate)" to redress discriminatory housing 
practices under the FHA.73 Unlike the enforcement provisions of the 
ADA, however, the FHA specifically provides that courts hearing hous-






Id. § 3604(f) (2). Again, such discrimination is prohibited on the basis of a 
handicap of the person seeking to buy or rent, a person "residing in or 
intending to reside in that dwelling" after sale or rental, or any person asso-
ciated with the person seeking to buy or rent. Id. § 3604(f) (2) (A)-(C). For 
cases demonstrating the broad sweep of the FHA, see generally Dadian v. 
Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming a jury verdict that a vil-
lage's denial of a hardship permit to build a garage on the front of a home 
to plaintiffs suffering from asthma and orthopedic problems constituted 
discrimination on the basis of handicap in violation of the FHA); Conn. 
Hasp. v. New London, 129 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D. Conn. 2001) (granting prelim-
inary injunction barring municipality from closing a halfway house for re-
covering substance abusers on zoning grounds because of a likelihood that 
the municipality's refusal to accommodate the halfWay house discriminated 
against its members in violation of the FHA); United States v. Philadelphia, 
838 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that a city's refusal to allow sub-
stitution of a side yard for a zoning ordinance requiring a back yard at a 
building intended for use as a home for homeless suffering from mental 
illness or recovering from substance abuse violated the FHA); Horizon House 
Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Pa. 
1992) (holding that a zoning ordinance requiring that group homes for the 
mentally retarded be spaced at least 1,000 feet apart constituted discrimina-
tion on the basis of handicap and thus violated the FHA). 
42 U.S.C. § 3604(£)(3)(B). 
See id. § 3603. 
See generally id. § 3613. 
Id. § 3613(c)(l). 
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tive damages.74 Furthermore, compensatory damages for emotional 
distress are recoverable in actions under the FHA.75 
C. The Eleventh Amendment and the Garrett Decision 
1. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity and Congress's Power 
to Abrogate it 
Despite the wide scope of protections provided by the ADA and the 
FHA against discrimination on the basis of disability, the U.S. Consti-
tution and other acts of Congress can, of course, affect the ways in 
which those protections function. The Eleventh Amendment pro-
vides the states with sovereign immunity-a private citizen cannot sue 
a state in law or equity in federal court.76 As an additional conse-
quence of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress may not provide a pri-
vate cause of action for money damages against the states in federal or 
state court.77 
The Supreme Court has held, however, that Congress may abrogate 
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity "when it both unequivo-
cally intends to do so and 'act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitu-
tional authority.' "78 While the Court has held that Congress may not 
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I pow-
ers,79 it has also held that Congress may abrogate the states' sovereign 
immunity pursuant to the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.8o Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Con-
gress the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment through "appropriate legislation."81 
74. Id. 
75. See, e.g., Szwast v. Carlton Apartments, lO2 F. Supp. 2d 777,783 (E.D. Mich. 
2000) (sustaining a jury's award of $3,000 in compensatory damages to a 
plaintiff who was denied apartment housing because she had children and 
observing that the plaintiff's testimony that she felt "crushed, embarrassed, 
and ashamed from the rejection" was sufficient evidence of her emotional 
distress). 
76. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "the 
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State." Id. The Eleventh Amendment applies 
not only to suits by a citizen of one state against another state, but also to 
suits by a citizen against his or her own state. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of 
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). 
77. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
78. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62, 73 (2000». 
79. See id. at 364. See also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80 (stating that "Congress' powers 
under Article I of the Constitution do not include the power to subject 
States to suit at the hands of private individuals"); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996). 
80. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80. See also Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
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In order for an act of Congress to constitute "appropriate" remedial 
legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it must demon-
strate "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre-
vented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. "82 
Furthermore, a pattern of Fourteenth Amendment violations by the 
states themselves must emerge in order for a remedial measure such as 
the abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity to constitute a valid 
exercise of Congress's § 5 enforcement powers.83 
2. Congress Abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
Under the ADA 
Section 12202 of the ADA provides that "a State shall not be im-
mune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of compe-
tent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter."84 Congress, therefore, 
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits by 
private citizens under the ADA.85 
3. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett 
In its recent decision in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
GarrettB6-a case that promises to have significant implications for all 
future claims brought under the ADA-the Supreme Court held that 
Congress's abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity 
under Title I of the ADA (which prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of disability) was invalid.87 Applying the "congru-
ence and proportionality" test from City of Boerne v. Flores,88 the Court 
held that evidence of states' employment discrimination against the 
disabled was insufficient to warrant the extreme remedial measure of 
abrogating the states' sovereign immunity.89 It further held that Con-
gress's action in doing so under Title I of the ADA was thus an invalid 
exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers.90 
The Garrett case arose when "Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse ... 
employed [by] the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital," 
and "Milton Ash[,] ... a security officer [employed by] the Alabama 
Department of Youth Services," filed suit against their employers seek-
82. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (quoting Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 
(1997) ). 
83. See id. at 368 ("Congress' § 5 authority is appropriately exercised only in 
response to state transgressions."). 
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2001). 
85. [d. 
86. 531 U.S. 356. 
87. See id. at 374. 
88. 521 U.S. 507,520 (1997). 
89. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. 
90. [d. at 374, 374 n.9. 
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ing monetary relief for violations of Title I.91 The Court had previ-
ously addressed the constitutionality of other acts of Congress that 
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity,92 but it had not 
yet addressed the question of whether the ADA validly abrogated that 
immunity. 
The Court found that the first requirement for a valid abrogation of 
the states' sovereign immunity-that Congress "unequivocally intend 
to do so"-was undisputedly met because of the clear language of sec-
tion 12202 of the ADA.93 The Court then determined that the second 
requirement for a valid abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity-that Congress undertake such abrogation pursuant 
to a "valid grant of constitutional authority"94-was not met because 
abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity in the ADA was not a 
valid exercise of Congress's § 5 enforcement power.95 Even though 
the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Con-
gress the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity,96 the Court reasoned that remedial action under the ADA lacked 
congruence and proportionality to the injuries at issue,97 holding 
"[ t] he legislative record of the ADA ... fails to show that Congress did 
in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employ-
ment against the disabled."98 
The Court found that the legislative history surrounding the ADA, 
although it describes many general incidences of discrimination 
against the disabled, does not provide sufficient evidence of unconsti-
tutional discrimination by the states themselves to render Congress's 
abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity a valid exer-
cise of its § 5 enforcement power.99 Furthermore, even though the 
91. [d. at 362. Title I of the ADA prohibits "discriminat[ion] against a qualified 
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in 
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or dis-
charge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other 
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) 
(2001). Garrett claimed that her employer discriminated against her when 
they required her to give up her position as Director of Nursing and accept 
a lower-paying position after she was diagnosed with breast cancer, there-
fore, taking "substantial" leave from work to undergo treatment. Garrett, 
531 U.S. at 362. Ash claimed that he faced discrimination by his employer 
when they failed to grant requests to modifY his duties and schedule to 
accommodate his chronic asthma and sleep apnea. [d. 
92. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding that 
"in the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. § 623,] 
Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity to suits by 
private individuals"). 
93. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363-64. 
94. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373. 
95. See id. at 374. 
96. [d. at 364. 
97. [d. at 374. 
98. [d. at 368. 
99. See id. at 369. 
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specific instances of employment discrimination did involve state ac-
tion, the action may not have violated the Fourteenth Amendment. lOo 
The Court also expressed concern that the remedial provisions of the 
ADA lacked congruence and proportionality to the injuries they were 
intended to address because the provisions require the states to make 
accommodations for the disabled that are not required by the Four-
teenth Amendment. lOl Because the legislative history of the ADA 
does not identify a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination in em-
ployment by the states against disabled individuals and because the 
remedies created under Tide I of the ADA were incongruent to any 
violations by the states, the Garrett court held that Congress's abroga-
tion of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in Tide I is 
invalid. 102 
4. Does the Rationale of Garrett Apply to Tide II? 
The Garrett decision narrowly held that Title I did not validly abro-
gate the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.103 The 
Court specifically declined to decide the issue of whether Title II of 
the ADA properly abrogated the states' sovereign immunity.104 The 
100. [d. at 370. The Court emphasized that the states' treatment of disabled 
individuals in the context of employment was subject only to rational-basis 
review. [d. at 367 (stating that the "[s]tates are not required by the Four-
teenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so 
long as their actions toward such individuals are rational"). See also 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (stating 
that "[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will 
be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to 
a legitimate state interest"). Thus, the Garrett Court observed that whether 
the few specific instances of state discrimination against the disabled re-
flected in the legislative record of the ADA would prove unconstitutional if 
subjected to rational-basis review was "debatable." See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 
370. 
101. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372. The ADA, the Court observes, requires state 
employers to "make existing facilities used by employees readily accessible 
to and usable by individuals with disabilities." [d. (quoting 42 U.S.c. 
§§ 12112(5)(b), 12111(9)). Moreover, a state employer could constitution-
ally "conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are able 
to use existing facilities." [d. at 372. 
102. [d. at 374. 
103. [d. at 374 n.9. 
104. [d. at 360 n.1. The Court observed that "no party ... briefed the question 
whether Title II of the ADA ... is available for claims of employment dis-
crimination when Title I of the ADA expressly deals with that subject" and 
that Title II "has somewhat different remedial provisions from Title I." [d. 
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lower federal courts are split on the issue,105 and the Supreme Court 
has not yet decided it.106 
Many lower federal courts that have addressed the issue seem to 
agree that the rationale of Garrett applies not only to Title I, but also to 
Title 11.107 Most significantly, the Fourth Circuit, in Wessel v. Glenden-
ing, held after the Project Life decision that "Congress did not validly 
abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states when it enacted Part A 
of Title II of the ADA."108 
Applying essentially the same analysis as that applied by the Su-
preme Court in Garrett,109 the Wessel majority first inquired as to 
whether Congress had "adequately expressed" its intent to abrogate 
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in Title 11.110 Concluding 
that Congress had "adequately expressed" such an intent, III the court 
then applied the "congruence and proportionality" test to determine 
whether Congress's abrogation of the states' immunity constituted a 
valid exercise of the enforcement powers granted to it in § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 112 This test is applied in three steps: First, 
the court must identify the scope of the constitutional right at issue; 
second, the court must conclude that Congress has demonstrated his-
tory and a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the states; 
and lastly, if history and a pattern exist, the court must determine 
whether the law is congruent and proportional to the wrong. 1 13 The 
m~ority identified the scope of the constitutional right at issue as the 
right of disabled people "not to be subject to arbitrary or irrational 
exclusion from the services, programs, or benefits provided by the 
105. See infra notes 107-125 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit was not 
required to decide the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity in the con-
text of Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening because Project Life released its claim 
for damages on appeal. 46 Fed. Appx. 147, 150 n.4, 2002 WL 2012545, at *2 
n.4 (4th Cir. Sept. 4, 2002). 
106. See supra Part C.1-3. 
107. See, e.g., Ass'n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Fla. Int'! Univ., 178 F. Supp. 2d 
1291, 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that the "Eleventh Amendment bars 
suit in federal court by an individual against a state under Title II of the 
ADA"). This case contains an exhaustive list of decisions with similar hold-
ings. Id. at 1293-94. See also Chaffin v. Kan. State Fair Bd., 348 F.3d 850, 
866 (lOth Cir. 2003) ("We agree ... that Title II of the ADA was not a valid 
abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity."); Doe v. Div. of 
Youth and Family Serv., 148 F. Supp. 2d 462, 489 (D.NJ. 2001). 
108. 306 F.3d 203, 215 (4th Cir. 2002). 
109. See supra notes 86-102 and accompanying text. 
1l0. Wessel, 306 F.3d at 208. 
llI. Id. (finding the ADA's explicit provision in 42 U .S.C. § 12202 which de-
clares that the states "shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State 
court" for violations of the ADA "unequivocally expresses [Congress's] in-
tent to abrogate"). 
112. Id. at 208-09. 
113. Id. at 209 (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365, 368, 372). 
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state."114 Additionally, the majority found, as did the Garrett majority, 
that Congress's abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity lacked the requisite "congruence and proportionality" because 
Congress had failed to identify a pattern of unconstitutional conduct 
by the states against the disabled and because the remedies provided 
by Title II were disproportionate to the conduct. 115 
Judge King, however, based his convincing dissent on two primary 
objections:1l6 (1) the majority's "refusal to give proper credit to spe-
cific record evidence of discrimination by state entities in public pro-
grams";117 and (2) the majority's "denial to Congress of the deference 
due when our elected representatives make general findings of fact in 
support of legislation."118 The dissent insisted that the legislative re-
cord supporting Congress's abrogation of the states' immunity in Title 
II is much stronger than the sparse legislative record surrounding Ti-
tle I, which led to the Garrett Court's conclusion that Congress had 
based its abrogation of the states' immunity on an inadequate record 
of state discrimination. 11g 
In addition to its disagreement with the majority over the adequacy 
of the legislative record surrounding Title II, the dissent also attached 
significant weight to the fact that the Garrett Court specifically reserved 
the issue of the validity of the abrogation of states' immunity under 
Title II.120 Furthermore, the dissent stressed the fact that the Garrett 
majority itself stated that "[t]he overwhelming majority of [accounts 
of state discrimination] pertain to alleged discrimination by the States 
in the provision of public services and public accommodations, which 
areas are addressed in Titles II and III of the ADA."121 Finally, the 
dissent emphasized the fact that whereas the legislative record of the 
ADA fails to explicitly state any conclusion by Congress that it had 
found a pattern of discrimination in public employment, the legisla-
tive record does state that persistent discrimination exists in the area 
of public services-the area governed by Title II.122 Thus, the dissent 
argued, Congress "did indeed identify a pattern of unconstitutional 
state action that justified abrogation of state sovereign immunity with 
respect to Title II of the ADA."123 
Other lower federal courts have held, as Judge King would have 
held, that Title II does constitute a valid abrogation of the states' Elev-
114. Id. at 2lO. 
115. Id. at 2lO-15. 
116. See id. at 215 (King,]., dissenting). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. See id. at 216. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370 n.7). 
122. Id. at 217-18; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
123. Wessel, 306 F.3d at 218 (King,]., dissenting). 
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enth Amendment immunity.124 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit has staunchly adhered to its pre-Garrett opinions hold-
ing that Congress validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.125 Until the Supreme Court issues a definitive ruling on 
the issue, lower courts will continue to disagree over whether or not 
the states are immune from suits for monetary damages under Title II. 
5. The Doctrine of Ex Parte Young: Injunctive Relief Remains Availa-
ble Notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
Even if Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity prevents a plain-
tiff from suing the state for damages under Title II, plaintiffs can still 
obtain injunctive relief as a remedy for wrongful discrimination by of-
ficials of the state. 126 The well-established doctrine of Ex parte Young 
provides that "an individual seeking only prospective injunctive relief 
for ongoing violations of federal law may bring suit against state offi-
cials in federal court."127 
Application of the doctrine of Ex parte Young generally proceeds 
under a four-part inquiry.128 First, the court must determine whether 
the action is against a state official or against the state itself; only in 
the former case is injunctive relief available. 129 Second, the court 
must examine "whether the alleged conduct of state officials consti-
tutes a violation of federal law."13o Third, the relief sought must be 
prospective injunctive relief, or the equivalent of a "retroactive award 









See Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Servs. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 111-12 
(2d Cir. 2001) (restricting the validity of Congress's abrogation of the 
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from monetary suits under Title II 
of the ADA to situations in which the plaintiff could establish that the viola-
tion at issue was motivated by "either discriminatory animus or ill will due 
to disability"); Amos v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 178 F.3d 212 
(4th Cir. 1999) (vacated Dec. 28, 1999). 
Miranda B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth 
Circuit first upheld Congress's abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity in Clark v. Cal., 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997). In that case, 
inmates of a state correctional facility alleged that they had suffered dis-
crimination in violation of Title II. Id. at 1269. The Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's denial of the state's motion to dismiss on the grounds of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 1271. The court reaffirmed its 
holding two years later in Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1175 (9th Cir. 
1999). In so doing, the court specifically noted Congress's "extensive fac-
tual findings regarding the widespread arbitrary and invidious discrimina-
tion which disabled people face" and indicated that it would defer to 
Congress's determination of how best to remedy that discrimination. Id. 
Chaffin v. Kan. State Fair Bd., 348 F.3d 850, 866 (10th Cir. 2003) (interpret-
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junctive relief must not implicate "special sovereignty interests."132 
Thus, where the Eleventh Amendment would otherwise bar a suit 
against the state for monetary damages, a plaintiff can still obtain in-
junctive relief against a state official under the circumstances set out 
above. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening 
Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening arose as a result of the unsuccessful 
efforts of Project Life, Inc. to find a berth in which to dock the U.S.S. 
Sanctuary.I33 Project Life is a non-profit organization that planned to 
use the Sanctuary-a decommissioned U.S. navy ship-as a temporary 
residential facility for women recovering from substance abuse. I34 
In 1994, Project Life began negotiating with the Maryland Port Au-
thority to find a place to dock the Sanctuary in the Baltimore Har-
bor. 135 While the port authority offered several possible berth 
locations to Project Life, the port authority subsequently withdrew 
those offers as a result of community opposition to Project Life's pres-
ence in the neighborhood. I36 
Project Life, along with three women hoping to participate in the 
residential programI37 on the Sanctuary, brought suit against Parris N. 
Glendening (the Governor of Maryland), the Director of the Mary-
land Port Authority, and several other defendants. I38 They claimed 
violations of the ADA, the FHA, and the Maryland Discrimination in 
Housing Act. I39 
132. Id. at 866-67 (citing ANR Pipeline Co. v. Lafaver, ISO F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 
1998) (holding that the state's interest in its tax collection system was a 
special sovereignty interest)). 
133. 139 F. Supp. 2d 703, 705 (D. Md. 2001). 
134. See id. Project Life plans to provide "rehabilitation services, including life 
skills and job training, for up to 300 women at a time, for rotations of 30 to 
90 days." Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening, 46 Fed. Appx. 147, 149,2002 WL 
2012545, *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 4,2002). 
135. Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening, No. WMN-98-2163, 1998 WL 1119864, at 
*1 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 1998) (mem.). 
136. See id. 
137. Id. The women, Angela Marie Adams, Vanessa Trudy Barlow, and Barbara 
Nevette Williams, brought the suit as a class action on behalf of themselves 
and other women similarly situated. See id. 
138. Id. The original defendants to the action included Parris Glendening, 
(Governor of Maryland), David Winstead (the Maryland Secretary of Trans-
portation), Tay Yoshitani (former director of the Maryland Port Authority), 
and the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration. See id. James White (the 
current executive director of the Maryland Port Authority) was later substi-
tuted for Tay Yoshitani upon the authorization of the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Maryland. See id. at *3 n.5. 
139. See Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *1. Project Life withdrew its claim 
under the Maryland Discrimination in Housing Act on March 12, 2001. 
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B. Project Life's Claim Under the ADA 
In the suit against the Maryland Port Authority and other state 
agencies and officials, Project Life and the class of plaintiffs claimed 
that the port authority's delay in leasing a berth to Project Life was the 
result of unlawful discrimination against the Sanctuary's intended re-
sidents-women recovering from substance abuse-and, thus, a viola-
tion of Title 11.140 Project Life claimed that it was being denied "the 
benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity" be-
cause of the disability of the population it intended to serve in viola-
tion of § 12132 of the ADA.141 
The Project Life court correctly upheld the jury's verdict that the Ma-
ryland Port Authority had violated the ADA by delaying its lease of a 
berth to Project Life. 142 The services of the Maryland Port Authority 
are the services of a public entity; Project Life's suit, therefore, was 
properly brought under § 12132 of the ADA.143 Project Life's pro-
posed clientele are individuals with disabilities under the ADA;144 
therefore, the Act prohibits discrimination against Project Life on the 
basis of those disabilities. 145 
Project Life presented evidence that local elected officials exerted 
pressure on the port authority not to enter into a lease with Project 
Life for a berth.146 In the defendant's initial motion to dismiss, they 
argued that the delay in leasing a berth to Project Life was not the 
result of negative community sentiment or pressure, but rather the 
result of the port authority's judgment that the residential nature of 
the Sanctuary's programs "would be inconsistent with the existing ac-
tivities of a busy commercial port."147 Convincing evidence to the 
contrary exists, however, in the fact that the port authority imposed an 
unusual condition on Project Life-before it could be given a berth 
for the Sanctuary, Project Life had to obtain "community support" for 
its presence in the neighborhood.148 Given the imposition of the 
"community support" requirement on Project Life, and given the evi-
Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening, 139 F. Supp. 2d 703, 705 n.2 (D. Md. 
2001). 
140. See Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *1; see also Project Life, Inc., 139 F. 
Supp. at 705. 
141. See Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *1-*2. 
142. See Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 705. The court further stated that "if 
it were to make its own factual determination, it too would find that Plain-
tiff was discriminated against on the basis of the population it intends to 
serve." Id. at 707. 
143. See Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864 at *2. See also supra note 36 and ac-
companying text. 
144. See Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *1, *2. 
145. See id. at *1, *2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132); see also supra notes 28-31 and 
accompanying text. 
146. See Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 70S. 
147. Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *1. 
148. Id. 
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dence that local officials attempted to prevent the leasing of a berth to 
Project Life by exerting pressure on the port authority,I49 the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Maryland had ample support for its 
finding that "the real reason ... for the State's refusal to enter into 
the lease was the desire of [the] elected officials that the Sanctuary's 
programs not be located 'in their backyard.' "ISO The port authority's 
and other defendants' "illegal acquiescence" to such negative commu-
nity sentiment constituted unlawful discrimination under the ADA. IS1 
Under § 12133 of the ADA, the court properly found that Project Life 
was entitled to an i~unction requiring the Maryland Port Authority to 
enter into a lease providing a berth for the Sanctuary.IS2 
C. Project Life'S Claim Under the FHA 
In addition to its ADA claim, Project Life also claimed that the Ma-
ryland Port Authority's and other defendants' delay in leasing a berth 
for the U.S.S. Sanctuary violated the FHA.lS3 The U.S. district court, 
in its memorandum opinion on the defendants' initial motion to dis-
miss, characterized Project Life's claim under the FHA as "unique."IS4 
Nonetheless, the court correctly found that the defendant's delay con-
stituted a violation of the FHA. ISS 
The FHA prohibits discrimination "in the provision of services or 
facilities in connection with [a] dwelling, because of a handicap."ls6 
The Sanctuary, although not yet a dwelling, would become a dwelling 
if made operational; therefore, the court correctly recognized that 
Project Life's claim was properly brought under the FHA.lS7 Another 
reason that the claim was correctly brought under the FHA is because 
Project Life is seeking access to "parking and utilities" for the opera-
tion of the Sanctuary, both of which are services and facilities of a 
public entity. ISS 
Finally, the court correctly found that the same conduct that was at 
issue under Project Life's ADA claim violated the FHA.lS9 In failing to 
provide a berth and its "services and facilities," the Maryland Port Au-
thority, and the other defendants, yielded to negative community sen-
timent and pressure based on prejudice toward substance abusers. I6o 
149. Id. 
150. Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 708. 
151. See id. 
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2001); see also supra notes 44-49 and accompanying 
text. 
153. See Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 705. 
154. Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *2. 
155. See Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 711. 
156. See Project Life, Inc., 1998 WL 1119864, at *2. 
157. See id. 
158. !d. 
159. Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 710-11. 
160. Id. at 711. 
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That "acquiescence" constituted discrimination and a violation of the 
FHA.161 Under § 3613 of the FHA, therefore, the court properly 
granted an injunction requiring the state to provide a berth for the 
Sanctuary. 162 
D. Eleventh Amendment 
The Project Life court declined to apply the holding of Garrett163 to 
Title II of the ADA and, thus, allowed the jury's nominal award of 
twelve dollars to stand. 164 The court noted "the split among the cir-
cuits as to" the issue of Congress's abrogation of the states' sovereign 
immunity in Title II, but it chose to follow the Fourth Circuit's reason-
ing in a subsequently vacated case that provides no primary author-
ity.165 Amos v. Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional 
Services166 was the only occasion on which the Fourth Circuit had, at 
the time Project Life was decided, addressed the issue of the validity of 
the abrogation of the states' immunity in Title 11.167 That case, in a 
laconic analysis of whether thirteen Maryland prison inmates' Title II 
claim against various state departments and officials was subject to the 
defense of sovereign immunity, held that Maryland's sovereign immu-
nity had been validly abrogated under Title II and that Maryland was 
subject to suit in the case. 168 The Project Life court recognized that 
Amos was subsequently vacated,169 but based its decision of the sover-
eign immunity issue on that case because it found the reasoning in 
Amos "compelling."170 
Unfortunately for future plaintiffs in Project Life's position, the 
Fourth Circuit's subsequent decision in Wessel forecloses the possibility 
161. /d. The court also noted: "[A] decision made in the context of strong, dis-
criminatory opposition becomes tainted with discriminatory intent even if 
the decision makers personally have no strong views on the matter." Id. 
(quoting Innovative Health Sys. v. White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir. 
1997». 
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613. See also supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. 
163. Garrett held that Title I of the ADA did not validly abrogate the states' Elev-
enth Amendment immunity. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001). 
164. See Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 707 n.5. 
165. Id. Also supporting its decision not to apply the holding of Garrett to Title 
II of the ADA was the fact that the Garrett Court had specifically declined to 
decide the issue of whether the abrogation of the states' sovereign immu-
nity in Title II was valid. Id. 
166. 178 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 1999). 
167. Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 707 n.5. 
168. Amos, 178 F.3d at 223. The court found that Title II was a valid abrogation 
of the states' sovereign immunity because Congress "unequivocally ex-
pressed its intent to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity" and because 
"the ADA is a valid exercise of [Congress's] power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id. 
169. See Amos, 205 F.3d 687. 
170. See ProjectLife, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 707 n.5. 
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of recovering damages from any state in the Fourth Circuit for viola-
tions of Title 11.171 A strong argument exists, however, that Wessel was 
wrongly decided, that the rationale of Garrett is limited to Title I of the 
ADA, and that Congress's abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity remains valid with respect to Title II. This argument 
is exemplified in the opinions of other federal jurisdictions that have 
allowed individuals to sue the state for damages under Title II even 
after Garrett,172 as well as in Judge King's dissenting opinion in 
Wessel. 173 
Although Wessel must control in Maryland, the Supreme Court has 
recently taken the opportunity to definitively decide whether Con-
gress validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity 
under Title 11.174 The question should be decided in the affirmative. 
Because Congress explicitly found that a pattern of state discrimina-
tion in public services against the disabled, its abrogation of the states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to Title II is an appropri-
ate exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers and 
should be allowed to stand. 175 
Regardless of whether the Eleventh Amendment barred the plain-
tiffs' suit for damages, Project Life remains a valid decision. As the dis-
trict court observed, a jury made a finding of liability, and despite the 
nominal award of twelve dollars in damages, the heart of the relief 
granted to Project Life is the detailed injunction ordering the Mary-
land Port Authority to provide a berth for the U.S.S. Sanctuary.176 
Under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, private individuals can sue state 
officials for injunctive relief, even though the Eleventh Amendment 
prevents them from suing the states for money damages. l77 Even the 
Garrett Court noted that its holding only affected suits against the 
states for money damages, and that injunctive relief was still available 
to aggrieved individuals. 178 The district court, then, acted properly 
even if the Eleventh Amendment barred the nominal damages 
awarded to Project Life. 179 
171. See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text. 
173. See supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text. 
174. On January 13, 2004, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case 
of Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2003), cm. granted 123 S. Ct. 
2622 (2003). See Tennessee v. Lane, No. 02-1667, 2004 WL136390 (U.S. 
Jan. 13,2004). 
175. Id. 
176. See Project Life, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 706, 71l. 
177. See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text. 
178. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9. 
179. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit, in its unpublished per curiam opinion on the 
state's appeal, rejected the state's claim that Project Life's release of the 
damage award voided the jury's finding of liability. See Project Life, Inc. v. 
Glendening, 146 Fed. Appx. 147,150,2002 WL 2012545, at *2 n.4 (4th Cir. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
It is hoped that the Supreme Court will in the future provide gui-
dance on whether Congress validly abrogated the states' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in Title II of the ADA and, thus, whether plain-
tiffs can institute monetary damages against the state for violations of 
that statute. Whatever the outcome of that dispute, however, recover-
ing substance abusers can rest assured that they can still obtain some 
protection from state violations of the ADA in the form of injunctive 
relief. The decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Mary-
land in Project Life v. Glendening embodies this protection. By holding 
that a denial of the services and facilities of a public entity as a result 
of acquiescence to community animus toward substance abusers con-
stitutes unlawful discrimination in violation of the ADA and the FHA, 
the court reaffirmed its commitment to the underlying purposes of 
those acts-the elimination of discrimination against the disabled. 
Sarah D. Bruce 
Sept. 4, 2002). The Fourth Circuit affinned the District Court's decision. 
Id. at 151, 2002 WL 2012545, at *3. 
